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The opposite view, that insolvency alone does not confer upon
the court power to exercise the
doctrine of equitable set-off, is held
in many cases.
In Bradley v. Angell, 3 Comstock,
475, the reason for the position is
thus stated: "The proposition is,
in effect, to change the contract of
the parties in some of its most important provisions, in order to meet
a supposed equity arising from
matters expfostfacto."
A similar ground is taken in
Spaulding v. Backus, 122 Mass.,
553; Appeal of Farmers' and
Mechanics' Bank, 48 Pa., 57; Bosler v. Bank, 4 Pa., 32; Kensington
National Bank v. Shoemaker, ii
W. N. C. (Pa.), 215; Jeffryes v.
Agra & Masterman's Bank, L. R.,
2 Eq., 674; in re Commercial Bank,
L. R., i Chan. App., 538; Lockwood v. Beckwith, 6 Mich., 168;
Henderson v. McVey, 32 Ala., 471 ;
Walker v. Wigginton, 50 Ala., 579.
As it is said in the principal case,
these authorities are irreconcilable.
In those States where there is no
express declaration upon this question it is impossible to say which
doctrine will be adopted.

The rule followed in the principal case seems, however, to be
preferable. As an assignor for the
benefit of creditors is not a purchaser for value, but a mere volunteer, representing the insolvent
and the insolvent estate, it is not
clear why a debt against the insolvent, maturing after insolvency,
should not be set off in the same
manner as one maturing before.
The assignment is made for the
benefit of all creditors of the insolvent, and it is immaterial, as
far as the question of distribution
is concerned, whether the debt is
due at insolvency or not. If due
at the time of distribution it is
entitled to participate. There appears to be no ground for making
the maturity of the debt at the
time of insolvency determine the
right to set-off. If allowing a setoff where the debt is not due at
insolvency is to make a preference
of creditors, it would also appear
that such allowance to debts matured at insolvency creates a similar
preference.
HORAcE L. CHEYNEY.

Philadelphia.
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As the present number of the AMERICAN LAW REGISREVIEW goes. to press, news comes to us of the
death of one of our most valued contributors. WILLIA.f
WHARTON SMITH, EsQ., of the Philadelphia Bar, was
drowned at Newport, on July 3 d. Those of the "Abstracts
of Recent Decisions" in this number which are signed with
his initials will have an interest well-nigh sacred in the
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eyes of those who knew him, as being the last piece of
work wrought by a dearly loved friend whose working
days are over.
After taking his bachelor's degree at Harvard, Mr.
SMITH entered the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania, from which he was graduated in the spring of
1888. The Sharswood Prize was awarded him for his able
graduation essay on "Laws Impairing the Obligation of
Contracts." Since that time he has devoted himself assiduously to the study and practice of his profession. He
wrote the article on "joint Executors, "in the American
andEnglish Encyclotedia of Law, and contributed to the
AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER for December, 189i, a
valuable annotation on the case of Hoyt v. Hoyt. For
the April number of the current volume of the AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER AND REVIEW he wrote the note on "Contributory Negligence," which has received much favorable
notice. He had lately been collecting material for a monograph on the same subject, and had set himself the task of
preparing, during the present summer, a work on the "Jurisdiction of Orphans' Courts in Pennsylvania as Courts of
Equity." Only a few weeks ago he was elected to the
honorable position of President of the Law Academy of
Philadelphia.
In him theJunior Bar loses one of its most promising
members; but it is not only the profession that feels his
loss. His death has cast a gloom over an unusually large
circle of acquaintances; and it has plunged in a grief too
sacred to be expressed in public print that smaller circle
of warm friends, who felt for him a love which it is the
privilege of few men to inspire.
STARE DECIsIs: A NEw METHOD OF AVOIDING THE
RULE SUGGESTED.-The rule of S4are Decisis, together

with the nature of appellate courts generally, has lately
received a lengthy exposition by the Supreme Court of
Georgia.' The necessity for the rule is set forth, half huSEllison v. Georgia Railroad and Banking Company, decided October
19, 1891.
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morously, in the opinion by Chief-Justice BECKLEY: "Some
courts," writes the learned Judge, "live by correcting the
errors of others and adhering to their own. On these terms
courts of final review hold their existence, or those of them
which are strictly and exclusively courts of review, without
any original jurisdiction, and with no direct function but
to find fault or see that none can be found. With these
exalted tribunals, who live only to judge the Judges, the
rule of Stare Decisis is not only a canon of the public good,
but a law of self-preservation. At the peril of their lives
they must discover error abroad, and be discreetly blind to
its commission at home. Were they as ready to correct
themselves as others, they could no longer speak as absolute oracles of legal truth ; the reason for their existence
would disappear, and then destruction would speedily supervene. Nevertheless, without serious detriment to the public, or peril to themselves, they can and do admit, now and
then, with cautious reserve, that they have made a mistake.
Their rigid dogma of infallibility allows of this much relaxation in favor of truth, unwittingly forsaken. Indeed,
reversion to the truth, in rare instances, is highly necessary
to their material well-being. Though it is a temporary
degradation from the type of judicial perfection, it has to
be endured to keep the type itself respectable. Minor
errors, even if quite obvious, or important errors, if their
existence be fairly doubtful, may be adhered to, and repeated indefinitely ; but the only treatment of a great and
glaring error, affecting the current administration of justice
in all the courts of original jurisdiction, is to correct it.
When an error is of this magnitude, and moves in so wide
an orbit that 'it competes with truth in the struggle for
existence, the maxim for a Supreme Court-supreme in the
majesty of duty as well as in the majesty of power-is not
Stare Decisis, but fialtustiliaruat caiu."
The frank way in which the Chief Justice acknowledges that courts of appeal, not only live by correcting the
errors of others, but, by "adhering to their own" is refreshing. Yet it may be questioned whether appellate
courts are necessarily always placed in the position, when
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a wrong principle of law leads to a mistaken decision
and a similar case comes before them, of adhering to the
error, or lowering their dignity by confessing themselvesin the wrong. The true method by which both of these
alternatives may in many cases be avoided, is indicated by
the way in which courts unconsciously overrule themselves.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the development of the constitutional law has given several examples
of this unique method of avoiding a'lengthy exposition of
the rule of Stare Decisis. One example will suffice:
In the case of Hinson v. Lott the Court, following the
2
principles adopted in Woodruff v. Parham, decided that a
State could tax one who imported liquors from another
State, provided an equal tax was imposed upon the
manufacture of liquor within the State. The principle of
the decision was that the tax, which did not discriminate
between the product of a State and other products, was constitutional. Instead of repudiating this principle az applied
to liquor in the hands of the importer before the first sale,
the Court affirmed their previous decisions in the case of
Machine Company v. Gage,3 which case presented a similar
state of facts, involving the constitutionality of a tax on
the importation of sewing machines. At the same time,
when the next case, involving a discriminating tax, Welton
v. Missouri,' came up for decision, instead of treating the
tax as void, because discriminating, the Court treated it as
a regulation of commerce, void because the national nature
of the subject required an uniform rule, and, therefore, the
right to regulate was exclusively in Congress.
This last principle was firmly established by repeated
decisions. Then the case of Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing
District 5 came before the Court. This case involved the
constitutionality of a tax on all drummers doing business
in the State, as applied to those who sold the products of
other States. The law did not discriminate between drummers who were citizens of- other States and those of Tennessee. And yet the Court, through Mr. Justice BRADLEY,
1

S Wall, 148.

28 Wall,

123.

3

ioo U. S., 676.

491 U. S., 275.

512o U.

S., 489.

-

EDITORIAL NOTES.

was now able to say with an appearance of surprise: "It
is strongly urged,. as if it were a malerialpoint in the case,
that no discrimination is made between domestic and foreign
drummers-those of Tennessee and those of other Statesthat all are taxed alike. But that does not meet the difficulty. Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even
though the same amount of tax should be laid on domestic
commerce, or that which is carried on solely within the
State."
As a result, the case of Hinson v. Lott, and its predecessor, Woodruff v. Parham, may be considered to be discarded. Yet this has been accomplished without the Court
being put to the necessity of lowering their dignity by expressly overruling the decisions in those cases.
Bad decisions, where they are not based on the facts
of a particular case, in which instance they are usually unimportant, and can be easily corrected, almost invariably
rest on wrong principles of law. It is seldom that a court
makes a wrong deduction from tha right principle. In the
foregoing illustration the rule that the constitutionality of
a State.tax on interstate commerce depended on the fact of
discrimination was unsound. To have expressly abandoned
this principle in the case of Machine Company v. Gage,
which they would have had to do to declare the tax in
that case unconstitutional, would have been to lower their
dignity and so far impair that "oracular quality" which is
essential to the continued usefulness of an appellate court.
It may be that the change of ground was unconscious.
The consciousness or unconsciousness of the action is immaterial. One thing, however, is proved by the example
given: the true method to avoid following a bad decision,
and yet preserve the dignity of the appellate tribunal, is for
the members of the bench to be careful not to base similar
cases on the wrong principle; but, at the same time, until
new and correct principles have been substituted, to follow
the wrong decision when a case involving similar facts
comes before them.
W. D. L.
112 o U. S., 497.

